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Workers' Compensation: Expanding the Intentional
Tort Exception to Include Willful, Wanton, and
Reckless Employer Misconduct
For more than seventy years, workers' compensation has pro-
vided the exclusive remedy for job-related injuries arising from em-
ployer negligence.' The courts, however, have recognized an
exception for an employer's intentional torts.2 Intentional torts do
not conform with the philosophy underlying workers' compensation
and are therefore remedied through common law recovery. Courts
and legislatures have almost uniformly limited an employee to exclu-
sive recovery under workers' compensation for any employer miscon-
duct lacking a specific intent to injure.3 Consequently, the present
system permits employers to impose obviously dangerous working
conditions on employees-at workers' compensation's relatively re-
duced level of recovery-because the employee frequently cannot
prove an employer's specific intent to cause harm. This result offends
the dual policy of the workers' compensation system-to encourage a
safe workplace while providing adequate compensation for certain
injuries. Furthermore, workers' compensation was never intended to
cover such employer misconduct. 4 But for more than seventy years,
1 States began to enact workers' compensation statutes in the early 1900's. These stat-
utes were subject to constitutional attack as an unconstitutional taking of property without
due process, and many lived a short life. As a result, many states proposed "elective" statutes,
granting the employer the option to be bound by the compensation or subject to common law
tort liability without the three common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption-
of-the-risk, and the fellow servant rule. In 1917, New York amended its constitution to per-
mit a compulsory compensation law. That same year, the Supreme Court of the United
States held this compulsory-type law, the election-type law, and an "exclusive-state-fund"-
type law constitutional. Presently, all fifty states have statutorily provided a version of work-
ers' compensation. See 1 & 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§§ 5.20, 5.30, 65.11 & n.2, 67.00 (1982).
2 See generaly 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.00-68.13. See also notes 3 7-49 infra and
accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.D. 1983); Houston
v. Bechtel Assocs., 522 F. Supp. 1094, 1096-98 (D.D.C. 1981); Griffin v. George's, Inc., 267
Ark. 91, 96, 589 S.W.2d 24, 27 (1979); Williams v. International Paper Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d
810, 816-19, 181 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345-47, hearing denied (1982); Great Western Sugar Co. v.
District Ct., 610 P.2d 717, 720 (Mont. 1980). See also 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13.
4 Workers' compensation is meant to cover workplace accidents. See notes 12, 15, 16, 40,
41, 80, 87-91 infra and accompanying text. Where the employer willfully and deliberately
fails to provide a safe workplace, the injured employee should be allowed to sue at common
[Vol. 58:890]
courts and legislatures have mistakenly placed willful employer mis-
conduct within the system's exclusive coverage.
This note examines the fallacies underlying the present rationale
for including willful employer misconduct within the statutory
scheme. Part I sets forth the basic workers' compensation scheme
and its underlying social philosophy. It also presents the problem of
erroneous judicial and legislative treatment of willful employer mis-
conduct. Part II examines both negligence and intentional torts and
the attendant problems regarding their statutory coverage and non-
coverage. Part III presents the judicial treatment of willful, wanton,
and reckless employer misconduct. Part IV evaluates the purported
justification for exclusive statutory inclusion of willful employer mis-
conduct. And Part V suggests an approach for according willful em-
ployer misconduct a common law remedy.
I. Present Judicial and Legislative Treatment of Workers'
Compensation
A. The Workers' Compensation Scheme
Workers' compensation laws compromise the employee's right to
a common law tort suit for job-related injuries in return for relatively
quick, certain, and standardized compensation.5 The injured em-
ployee need not prove any employer negligence; nor will the em-
ployee's own negligence bar compensation. The employer gives up
his common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption-of-
the-risk, and the fellow servant rule, for the exclusive, limited, insur-
ance-like remedy provided by the particular workers' compensation
scheme.6
The system's indifference to fault allows for a virtually guaran-
teed employee recovery but necessarily precludes an amount compa-
rable to any common law recovery. 7 It does not nor was it ever
intended to supplant the common law tort system. 8 The workers'
law. Bohlen, A Problem in the Z)rafling of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L. REV. 328,
333 (1912).
5 Larson, The Nature and Orzgins of Workmen r Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 229
(1952) [hereinafter cited as Nature and Origins].
6 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 531 (4th ed. 1971).
7 The basis of workers' compensation is its certain and standardized recovery. Because
the employer cannot assert his three common law defenses, it would be unfair to entitle the
injured employee to compensation equal to a common law recovery. The system is not purely
tort-based but retains aspects of socialism. Nature and Origins, supra note 5, at 216. This hy-
brid quality bars recovery equal to that at common law.
8 See generall.y Nature and Origins, supra note 5. See also note 91 inra.
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compensation system compensates an injured employee for his em-
ployer's negligence,9 but does so according to the system's original
design of merely providing benefits sufficient to avoid economic and
social degradation. ° This "duty" to provide is not a penalty im-
posed to deter wrongful employer misconduct; penalties are appro-
priate only where fault is in issue."I Yet, the system ultimately deters
employer misconduct since it works to the employer's advantage to
reduce workplace accidents and their attendant compensatory
liability. 12
The inquiry in a workers' compensation claim is focused not
upon a person's fault in relation to an event; rather, it is upon the
relationship of the event to the employment.' 3 The injury must be
shown to "arise out of" and occur "in the course of" the employ-
ment.' 4 Additionally, statutes and judicial interpretation commonly
provide that coverage extends to all workplace "accidents."'' 5 Thus,
the scheme is meant to provide compensation for those "accidents"
that are thought to be naturally associated with the business opera-
tion.16 The workers' compensation theory provides that the em-
ployer should compensate the injured employee and then "cost-out"
the injuries in the sale of the product.' 7 Ultimately, then, the con-
sumer provides for the compensation coverage.' 8
Despite the focus of workers' compensation on the accidental na-
ture of the injury, broad interpretation of the statutes erroneously
9 The workers' compensation system was meant to cover only negligently caused indus-
trial accidents. See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907, 913 (W. Va. 1978).
10 See Bohlen, supra note 4, at 329-32. Workers' compensation was designed to prevent
injured employees from becoming dependent upon public and private forms of charity. Id at
331-32. The employees were recognized as being unable to bear the costs of suffering and the
accompanying social degradation. Id at 331.
11 Bohlen, supra note 4, at 332-33.
12 Id at 333.
13 Nature and Origins, supra note 5, at 208-09.
14 The term "arising out of" concerns primarily a showing of causal connection. See 1 A.
LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.10. The term "in the course of" concerns a showing that the injury
occurred within the time and place boundaries of the employment. See 1 A. LARSON, supra
note 1, § 14.00.
15 All but the following nine states require that the injury be the result of an accident:
California, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Da-
kota, and Texas. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 37.10 n.1.
16 Because the "accidents" result from the employer's operation of his business, he is held
socially responsible for compensation. The theory holds that the cost of compensation by
accident should be borne by the industry creating it. The cost may then be passed on to the





includes serious employer misconduct within their exclusive cover-
age. Such a reading cloaks the employer with an unjustified immu-
nity from common law liability. Courts readily agree that ordinary
negligence is covered exclusively by workers' compensation, 19 and in-
tentional torts are outside the exclusive coverage.20 The problem,
however, involves treatment of those levels of misconduct that lie
above ordinary negligence yet fail to rise to an intentional tort. In
determining whether conduct is accompanied by the required level
of intent to permit common law relief in addition to the workers'
compensation remedy, courts grope for fine distinctions in a contin-
uum of mental states.
The most problematic area in judicial and statutory treatment
of workers' compensation involves the so-called "willful, wanton, and
reckless" misconduct of the employer. Such misconduct appears in
two distinguishable and reccurring lines of cases. The first group in-
volves disease-related injury; the other involves injury from an em-
ployer's violation of safety statutes or regulations.
1. Disease-related Cases
Recently, courts have faced a dramatic increase in the number
of cases involving employees contracting work-related diseases.
2 1
The most notable increase in litigation lies in the asbestos-manufac-
turing industry.2 2 In these cases, the employer is alleged to have will-
fully exposed unsuspecting employees to a work environment likely
to cause an asbestos-related disease.2 3 Courts usually deny the em-
ployee's recovery for failing to prove the employer's specific intent to
injure.2 4 Proof that an employer willfully, wantonly, and recklessly
19 See Houston v. Bechtel Assocs., 522 F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (D.D.C. 1981).
20 See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13 n.10.1.
21 See Smith & Channon, The Rising Storm, 17 FORUM 139 (1981).
22 As many as 25,000 asbestos-related tort suits have been filed since 1980. Podgers, Toxic
Tme Bombs, 67 A.B.A.J. 139 (1981). Estimates indicate that between 8 and 11 million work-
ers have been exposed to asbestos since the early 1940's. Smith & Channon, supra note 21, at
140. If these estimates are correct, at least two million will die of asbestos-induced lung can-
cer, one million of asbestos-induced gastrointestinal cancer, and one million of non-malignant
asbestosis. Id at 142. Moreover, these figures do not include disabling yet non-fatal asbestos-
related injuries. Id at 142 n.16.
23 See, e.g., Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales, 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981).
24 Id See a/so Sernia v. Statewide Contractors, Inc., 6 Ariz. App. 12, 429 P.2d 504, reh 7
denied, review denied (1967)(numerous inspector warnings to employer regarding unsafe ditch
shoring held insufficient to show employer's intent to injure in a cave in killing two employ-
ees); Williams v. International Paper Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 810, 181 Cal. Rptr. 342, hearing
denied (1982) (failure to provide a safe workplace does not rise to the level of an intentional
tort); McAdams v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 395 So. 2d 411, reh g denied (La. App. 1981), cert.
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exposed the employee to the risk fails to meet the requirement that
the employer intended the result.2 5 Although the employer miscon-
duct is intended, the resulting employee injury is not intended.2 6
Thus, courts refuse to hold that the conduct falls within the inten-
tional tort exception. The employee typically is disabled for life
(often terminally) with only the limited statutory workers' compensa-
tion remedy available as compensation. 27 And the employer remains
largely undeterred from exposing employees to known risks of haz-
ardous workplaces.
2. Employer's Violation of Safety Statutes and Regulations
The second group of cases involves an employer's intentional vi-
olation of a statute or regulation designed to ensure workplace safety.
In one common situation, the employer intentionally removes a
safety guard from a piece of machinery because it slows production.
The employee is next instructed or permitted to operate the machin-
ery without the guard. Frequently, the employee is then injured and
often permanently disabled. The employee who brings suit alleging
both intentional and willful employer misconduct is denied recovery
on the basis that, though the employer may have intentionally re-
denied, 400 So.2d 1380 (1981) (removal of or failure to provide a safety device insufficient to
prove that the employer believed the result substantially certain to follow); Great Western
Sugar Co. v. District Ct., 610 P.2d 717 (Mont. 1980) (numerous allegations in complaint failed
to constitute claim for intentional employer tort); Foster v. Allsop Automatic, Inc., 86 Wash.
2d 579, 547 P.2d 856 (1976)(employee failed to show his employer's specific intent to injure);
Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 516 P.2d 522, 525 (Wash. App. 1973)(an employer "guilty of seri-
ous and willful misconduct by knowingly refusing to comply with a statute or rule intended to
protect a workman [may not] necessarily hav[e] a deliberate intention to produce such
injury").
25 See note 100 infra and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales, 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981); Oman v.
Johns-Mansville Corp., 482 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Va. 1980); Petruska v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
83 F.R.D. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
27 See, e.g., Waldrop v. Vistron Corp., 391 So. 2d 1274, cert. denied, 394 So. 2d 281 (1980),
where the employee contracted colon cancer from his continuous exposure to acrylonitrile, a
known carcinogen. Id at 1275. The employee alleged that he did not know the substance's
danger and that the employer exposed him to the carcinogen "intentionally, knowingly and
with willful, wanton and reckless disregard" for his safety. Id The court refused to broaden
the "intentional tort exception," holding such properly belongs to the legislature, and denied
recovery. Id at 1277. The court noted that the life of the employee's wife "has been con-
verted from a normal one to one filled with doctors, hospitals, operations, medication and
recuperation. She must watch her husband, consumed by the ravages of cancer, as he awaits
death." Id at 1278. Regarding the wife's claims for mental anguish, the court stated,
"[B]ecause of the long line of jurisprudence and because our Supreme Court has had many
opportunities to change the law but has failed to do so, we reluctantly must reject [her] . . .
claims as not being recoverable under current Louisiana law." Id at 1278.
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moved the device, he did not, thereby, intend to injure the em-
ployee.28 Although the employer recognizes the probability of
injury, the courts treat the conduct as a form of gross negligence, and
therefore relegate the employee to a workers' compensation recov-
ery.29 The employer faces little deterrence from removing the devices
especially as long as the marginal increase in production out-dis-
tances the cost of the workers' compensation recovery.30
II. Traditional Treatment of Misconduct Under Workers'
Compensation
Traditionally, whenever the employee is injured because of the
employer's negligence, the employee's exclusive remedy is through
workers' compensation. Under these statutes, the employee's burden
of proving the employer's liability is light. He must show only that
the injury arose from and occurred in the course of employment.3'
Also, these statutes bar the employer from presenting defenses to the
employee's claim.3 2 The employee's burden is thus relatively simple
and the recovery certain.
Treating negligence under statutory coverage is consistent with
and naturally follows from the underlying policy of workers' compen-
sation. As in negligence analysis, where the actor's state of mind is
not at issue,33 workers' compensation schemes provide recovery
28 Set, e.g., Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1955); McAd-
ams v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 395 So. 2d 411, rehg denied (La. App. 1981), cert. denied, 400
So. 2d 1380 (1981); Duk Hwan Chung v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 276 Or. 809, 556 P.2d 683 (1976);
Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 7, 516 P.2d 522 (1973).
29 See, e.g., Griffin v. George's, Inc., 267 Ark. 91, 589 S.W.2d 24 (1979); Johns-Manville
Sales v. Workers' Compensation, 96 Cal. App. 3d 923, 158 Cal. Rptr. 463, reh g denied, hearing
denied (1979).
30 It would be nice to think that employers are impelled by humane motives to consider
the health and safety of their employees as the paramount concern. But the unfortunate
truth is that business reacts best to hopes of profit maximization. Where some employers can
avoid more costly protections for their employees without incurring additional liability, they
usually will do so. Employers generally will act only if given the monetary incentive to do so.
See Bohlen, supra note 4, at 334-35.
31 See note 14 supra.
32 The employer, for his part in the workers' compensation bargain, relinquishes his right
to assert the three common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption-of-the-risk,
and the fellow servant rule. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
33 The standard of care in negligence is imposed by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks of harm, thus existing even where the actor has supposedly "exer-
cised his best judgment" after carefully considering the consequences. W. PROSSER, supra
note 6, § 31, at 145. The negligent actor need not desire or know to a substantial certainty
the consequences that result. Id See also Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907, 913-14,
925 (W. Va. 1978). In Aandolidis, the court noted that " '[n]egligence' conveys the idea of
advertence as distinguished from premeditation or formed intention." Id at 914. In Johns-
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where the employer does not intend to injure the employee. 34 The
schemes provide recovery simply because the employer should pro-
vide for the inherent risks of the workplace.35 Negligence can be con-
sidered an inseparable aspect of the job, but intentional torts cannot.
Negligence is also difficult to prevent since it is not always contem-
plated conduct.3 6 Allowing common law recovery for negligence
would do little to deter future negligence. Accordingly, the statutes
properly provide the exclusive remedy for employer negligence.
A. The Intentional Tort Exception
Nearly all states have held the exclusive remedy provisions of
workers' compensation acts to bar common law tort recovery by an
employee for any employer misconduct not rising to the level of an
intentional tort.37 However, where the employer has acted with the
requisite intent, the employee is no longer limited to the statutory
recovery and thus may bring suit outside the statute for compensa-
tory and punitive damages. 38 Three theories have been advanced to
Manville Sales v. Workers' Compensation, 96 Cal. App. 3d 923, 932, 158 Cal. Rptr. 463, 467
(1979), the court noted that
[s]erious and wilful misconduct is basically the antithesis of negligence, and. . . the
two types of behavior are mutually exclusive; an act which is merely negligent and
consequently devoid of either an intention to do harm or of knowledge or apprecia-
tion of the fact that danger is likely to result therefrom cannot at the same time
constitute wilful misconduct.
Id at 932, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 467 (quoting Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
40 Cal. 2d 102, 120, 251 P.2d 955, 964 (1953)).
34 See Nature and Origins, supra note 5, at 208. Recall that workers' compensation does not
examine fault. See notes 5-7 supra. Consider two possible scenarios. Under the first, the em-
ployer is negligent and the employee fault-free. Under the second, the employer is innocent
and the employee is negligent. The injured employee recovers in both circumstances as the
system is blind to fault. See also Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907, 910-11 (W. Va.
1978) (describing the "no-fault" aspects of workers' compensation).
35 See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 7.10. Such injuries associated with employment in-
clude fingers getting caught in gears, machinery breaking, tractors tipping, and excavations
caving in. Id This assumes, of course, that the employer does not knowingly permit such
injuries.
36 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
37 For a listing of those states recognizing the intentional tort exception, see 2A A. LAR-
SON, supra note 1, § 68.13, and the cases cited in note 10.1.
38 See, e.g., Wade v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 693 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982); Boek v. Wong
Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milicron Chems., Inc.,
69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982) (allowing employees' suit against employer for
intentional exposure of employees to dangerous chemicals and intentional failure to report
this dangerous condition to various state and federal agencies). A classic case is Sumski v.
Sauquoit Silk Co., 66 Lackawanna Jurist 118 (1965). There, an employee became severely ill
from inhaling a dry cleaning solution of carbon tetrachloride. The employer, knowing that a
substitute solution would not clean as well, placed the original solution in unmarked bottles
[April 1983]
[Vol. 58:890]
support this result, but only one offers a logical justification.39
The only logical theory justifying the intentional tort exception
states that the employer's intentional tort bars the employer from
claiming his act was "accidental" and under statutory coverage.40
Thus, the legal justification for the common law suit is its non-acci-
dental character.41 Under this "non-accidental" theory, once the
conduct strays from an accidental character, usually associated with
pure accidents and negligent acts, and involves more serious moral
blameworthiness, as found in intentional torts, the employer's reli-
ance on workers' compensation ceases.42 This theory thus comports
with basic equity principles-an employer should not be protected
when committing intentional torts.
Courts seem unwilling to narrow the workers' compensation
statutory coverage.43 The courts will find an intentional tort only
where the employer knew to a substantial certainty that harm would in
fact occur.44 Thus, courts have refused common law recovery outside
and returned them to the employee to use, causing further injury. The court found that the
employer "deliberately acted" to injure his employee.
39 See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.11. Although three theories exist, two are less
frequently advanced. One theory states that through an intentional act, the employer has
severed the employment relationship. Id The fallacy of the theory appears when the em-
ployee never actually terminates his employment, but rather continues working after the tort.
Id Another theory, the most fictitious, states that the assault does not "arise out of" the
employment. Id
40 See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.11.
41 See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
42 See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907, 911 (W. Va. 1978). The court ex-
amined the legislative history of an earlier workers' compensation act. The history clearly
revealed that the act was intended to cover "injuries happening through inadvertent failure,
without real moral turpitude." Id (emphasis added) (quoting Milwaukee v. Miller, 144 N.W.
188, 191 (Wis. 1913)); Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Products, Inc., 288 S.E.2d 511, 517 (W. Va.
1982) (workers' compensation traditionally held to cover employee injuries or death from in-
dustrial accidents).
43 See Houston v. Bechtel Assocs., 522 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (D.D.C. 1981)(court unwilling
to upset balance struck by the legislature regarding exclusivity provisions); Rosales v. Verson
Allsteel Press Co., 41 111. App. 3d 787, 793, 354 N.E.2d 553, 558 (1976)("[N]either moral
aversion to the employer's act nor the shining prospect of a larger damage verdict justifies
interference with what is essentially a policy choice of the legislature."); Kittel v. Vermont
Weatherboard, Inc., 138 Vt. 439, 441, 417 A.2d 926, 927 (1980)(court unwilling to upset
legislature's choice favoring quick, certain workers' compensation over contingent, full com-
mon law recovery); 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13. See also notes 123-24 infra and
accompanying text.
44 See Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.D. 1983). In Shearer,
defendant's employees were crushed to death when a mine ceiling slab gave way. Id at 551.
Although the plaintiffs alleged that by sending the employees to the shaft the employer in-
tended to injure the employees, the court held that the evidence failed to supliort such a
finding. Id at 559. Additionally, the court reaffirmed that a high risk or probability of harm
does not equal substantial certainty. Id; Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357,
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of workers' compensation for allegations of knowingly permitting an
unsafe work environment, 45 knowingly ordering the employee to per-
form extremely dangerous jobs,4 6 willfully failing to provide a safe
workplace, 47 and willfully and unlawfully violating a safety statute.48
Although the workers' compensation statutes were intended to cover
employers' negligent conduct, the courts have interpreted such stat-
utes to include all employer misconduct rising above negligence but
still falling short of intentional harm.49 This expansive reading of
workers' compensation abuses its design and should not be
continued.
B. Intentional Torts: Vicarious Liability Problems and the
Defense of Consent
An employer's negligence gives rise to a workers' compensation
claim even without a showing of employer liability.50 But, an em-
ployee who asserts a claim outside the workers' compensation statute
must attach blame to the employer. 5t Where the employer person-
ally assaults an employee, the employee has little difficulty establish-
380 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In Neal, the court noted that the employer's liability was subject only to
claims for "accidents." Id at 378-79. His liability could not be held to include such accidents
caused by his "gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious
negligence, breach of statute or other misconduct. . . short of intentional injury." Id at 379.
See also Keating v. Shell Chem. Co., 610 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 1980); Austin v. Johns-
Manville Sales, 508 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D. Me. 1981); Martinkowski v. Carborundum, 108
Misc. 2d 184, 185-86 (1981) (mere knowledge or even appreciation of the risk does not consti-
tute intent; the act must be committed with the desire to bring about the consequences that
actually result); W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 8, at 31; 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13;
cases cited at note 3 supra.
45 See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13 & n.14. See aso Houston v. Bechtel Assocs.,
522 F. Supp. 1094 (D.D.C. 1981); Sernia v. Statewide Contractors, Inc., 6 Ariz. App. 3d 12,
429 P.2d 504, reh g denied, review denied (1967); Williams v. International Paper Co., 129 Cal.
App. 3d 810, 181 Cal. Rptr. 342, hearing denied (1982); Great Western Sugar Co. v. District
Ct., 610 P.2d 717 (Mont. 1980).
46 See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13 & n.15. See also Griffin v. George's, Inc., 267
Ark. 91, 93, 589 S.W.2d 24, 25 (1979). But see Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907
(1978).
47 See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13 & n.16. See also Great Western Sugar Co. v.
District Ct., 610 P.2d 717 (Mont. 1980).
48 See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13 & n.17. See also Shearer v. Homestake Mining
Co., 557 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.D. 1983); Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 7, 516 P.2d
522 (1973).
49 See note 3 sura.
50 See note 34 supra.
51 Where the employer's negligence is concerned, the employee need not attribute blame
to the employer. The employee need only meet the tests of "arising out of" and "in the course
of" employment as well as the "accident" criteriori, if required by the particular statute. But
in intentional torts, the injured party must always connect liability to the party who commit-
[April 19831
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ing the employer's liability.52 Likewise, liability may be proven
where the tortfeasor is an alter ego of the employer.5 3 However, where
the tortfeasor is a co-employee who merely sits one rung higher on
the corporate ladder than the injured employee, the employee's abil-
ity to prove the employer's liability becomes more difficult and the
rationale somewhat more tenuous.54
Little problem exists for holding the employer liable for torts he
directs or authorizes against his employees. There, the employer acts
with such personal moral culpability that he must be held responsi-
ble. Courts fail, however, to explicitly distinguish those cases from
incidences where the intentional tort is committed not by the em-
ployer personally,55 but by a foreman or supervisor. This failure
causes a major problem in determining the employer's liability. Al-
though the foreman may be personally at fault, it does not necessar-
ily follow that this moral culpability can be shifted to the employer
simply by asserting the doctrine of respondeat superior.56 The employer
cannot be said to have intentionally committed such torts absent any
knowledge of their likelihood of occurrence.57 The employee's rem-
edy, at best, would be a claim of negligent employer supervision or
negligent hiring.58 But such a claim, based on negligence, is limited
to the exclusive remedy under workers' compensation.
An additional concern in determining employer liability for a
"supervisory employee's" intentional tort is the injured employee's
ted the tort. Where a co-employee commits the tort, attributing blame to the employer be-
comes an issue.
52 Where the employer is also the assailant, he is obviously the responsible party. See
Nature and Origins, supra note 5, at 207 n.3.
53 See, e.g., Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., Inc., 217 Ark. 350, 230 S.W.2d 28
(1950)(employer liability found where employee alleged an assault by the officer/general
manager of the corporation having the corporation's same name); Daniels v. Swofford, 286
S.E.2d 582 (N.C. App. 1982)(corporation will not be imputed with employee's intentional
tort where employee was mere supervisor and not alter ego). See also 2A A. LARSON, supra note
1, § 68.22.
54 See, e.g., Jablonski v. Moltack, 63 Ill. App. 3d 908, 380 N.E.2d 924 (1978)(mere supe-
rior not alterego to justify removal of employer immunity from suit); Daniels v. Swofford, 286
S.E.2d 582 (N.C. App. 1982).
55 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.21, at 13-28. But see Shearer v. Homestake Mining
Co., 557 F. Supp. 549 (D.S.D. 1983).
56 2A A. LARSON, sura note 1, § 68.21, at 13-28.
57 See, e.g., Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975)(suit against employer barred
since knowledge by supervisors of intentional torts was insufficient to attribute liability to
employer).
58 See, e.g., LaBonte v. National Gypsum Co., 110 N.H. 314, 269 A.2d 634, modaitd.for
denial ofreh ' (1970)(employee's injury from co-employee's assault established the employer's
negligent supervision, held an accidental injury, and thus compensable under workers'
compensation).
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potential for recovering from an employer merely by showing that
the supervisory employee is "one notch higher on the totem-pole"
than he.59 Allowing this type of recovery would present practical
problems. Consider a large industrial setting with a typical labyrin-
thian hierarchy. Under the theory outlined above, a foreman at the
bottom of the hierarchy could subject the employer to common law
liability without any employer awareness. As one commentator ar-
gues, liability would no longer turn upon the work-relatedness of the
injury but would be subordinated to a determination whether the
tortfeasor outranks the injured employee. 60
Another problem concerning any intentional tort is the possibil-
ity of a consent defense. Valid consent precludes the existence of a
tort.6 ' An employer, for example, could argue that because his em-
ployees complained that safety guards hampered their work, he re-
moved the safety guards from a piece of machinery, despite a safety
statute or regulation prohibiting their removal. The employer could
argue that the employee consented to subsequent operation of the
machine and the attendant likelihood of injury.
Such an argument immediately gives rise to two traditional con-
siderations that vitiate consent. First, as a matter public policy, em-
ployers and employees are not capable of negotiating around legally
imposed requirements. 62 The safety statutes exist for the employee's
benefit. To allow him to contract around the statute would not only
limit the effectiveness of the legislation but completely frustrate its
purpose. Second, the employer and employee cannot reasonably be
considered to have equal bargaining power.63 The employer usually
has far superior bargaining strength. Where such unequal bargain-
ing power exists, it is highly doubtful that any consent was freely
given.
III. Judicial Treatment of Willful, Wanton, and Reckless
Employer Misconduct
While courts have readily supported an intentional tort excep-
tion to the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation, they have
59 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.21, at 13-34.
60 Id
61 W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 18, at 101.
62 Id § 18, at 101. Two justifications support this conclusion. First, the state has an
interest in protecting its citizenry. Second, the employer will be deterred from such future
misconduct. Id at 107. Additionally, such statutes are meant to protect a limited class of
persons from their own lack ofjudgment. Id
63 See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 453-54.
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been stubborn in recognizing a similar exception for willful, wanton,
and reckless employer misconduct. Courts have described willful,
wanton, and reckless conduct as occurring under three possible states
of mind: (1) deliberately for the purpose of injuring another; (2) in-
tentionally with knowledge that serious injury will probably result;
and (3) intentionally in disregard of the consequences. 64 The intent
element applies only to the act; there is usually a conscious indiffer-
ence to the results. Where the intent is not so evident but the con-
duct is far from a "proper state of mind," the intent may be
implied.65 Because courts usually do not permit a willful employer
misconduct exception, and because an employee faces a difficult bur-
den in proving an employer's intentional tort, the employee is often
limited to workers' compensation even in cases of serious employer
misconduct. 66
Judicial interpretation of the statutes exempts willful employer
misconduct from common law suits. 67 Some statutes provide a pen-
alty award to the employee where the conduct rises above that of
simple negligence. 68 The awards usually increase the compensation
64 Johns-Manville Sales v. Workers' Compensation, 96 Cal. App. 3d 923, 933, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 468, reh ' denied, hearing denied (1979). See also Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d
501, 505 (Iowa 198 1) (setting forth three elements for "wanton neglect": 1) knowledge of the
peril; 2) knowledge that the injury is probable; and 3) conscious failure to avoid the
peril)(emphasis added). "Serious and willful misconduct has been described as being 'much
more than mere negligence, or even gross or culpable negligence,' and as involving 'conduct
of a quasi criminal nature, the intentional doing of something either with the knowledge that
it is likely to result in serious injury or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probable
consequences." In re Bums, 218 Mass. 8, 10, 105 N.E. 601, 602 (1914). See also W. PROSSER,
supra note 6, § 34, at 184-86.
65 W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 34, at 184.
66 See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
67 See note 3 supra. But see Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
68 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982)Qncreased penalty award
for "serious and willful misconduct" of the employer). Other states allow an increased award
for violation of a statute or regulation. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1310(d) (1976 & Supp.
1981)(15% increase in compensation where the employer violates a state safety statute or
regulation); KY. REv. STAT. § 342.165 (1979)(15% increase in compensation where the em-
ployer fails to comply with a safety statute or regulation); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(4)
(Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1983) (15% increase in compensation where the employer fails to com-
ply with state safety statute or commission order); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52.-I-10 (1978) (10%
increase in compensation where the employer fails to observe statutory safety regulations);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1979) (10% increase in compensation where the employer willfully
fails to comply with statutory requirement or commission order); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-12
(1953) (15% increase in compensation where the employer fails to provide safety devices or
maintain a safe workplace); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (West 1973)(15% increase in compen-
sation for the employer's failure to comply with safety statute or lawful order of department,
but not to exceed $7,500); OHIo CONST. art. II, § 35 (15-50% increase in compensation for the
employer's failure to comply with specific requirements for protection of workers' safety).
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by fifty percent but never more than one hundred percent. Where
the initial recovery falls below an adequate common law remedy, an
increased "penalty" award usually does not as seriously affect the
employer nor as adequately recompense the injured employee. 69
Some states go so far as to require the injured employee to make an
exclusive election between a workers' compensation remedy and a
common law suit. 70 Given the employee's difficult burden of proof,
an election to sue may result in no remedy at all.
A well-reasoned judicial approach to the willful misconduct
question is presented in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries. 71 There the
court concluded that willful, wanton, and reckless conduct consti-
tuted "deliberate intent" within the meaning of the state's workers'
compensation statute.72 Thus, the court permitted the employee to
sue under common law. In Mandolids, the employer had placed into
operation, without safety guards, a ten-inch table saw that federal
inspectors had tagged as inoperable. 73 The employee objected to op-
erating the saw in such a dangerous condition. 74 The employer nev-
69 The penalty statutes may still render a recovery less than that at common law. As
such, the deterrent effect on the employer is not as great as could be under a common law
recovery. Moreover, penalty statutes attempt to find fault under a workers' compensation
system that pretends to be blind to fault. Penalty awards, therefore, are inconsistent with the
system's underlying no-fault premise.
70 Among the states mandating an election are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho,
Maine, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 73.10 n.40.
71 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978). See Annot., 96 A.L.R.3d 1064 (1979).
72 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978). Section 23-4-2 of the West Virginia Code provides in
part: "If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his employer to
produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the
employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of
action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of dam-
ages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter." W. VA. ACTS, ch. 10, § 28
(1913) (emphasis added).
Mandolidis involved three consolidated cases. In Snodgrass v. United States Steel, four
employees were injured and one killed when a platform on which they were working fell 25
feet into an excavation. 246 S.E.2d at 916. The employees and decedent employee's plaintiff
alleged inter alia numerous willful and intentional violations of safety regulations. Id The
court reversed the lower court's summary judgment for the employer. Id at 919. Dishmon v.
Eastern Associated Coal Corp., involved allegations of intentional, willful, and wanton em-
ployer misconduct for allowing the decedent employee to work in an unsafe workplace. Id at
919-20. The employee was crushed to death when the slate ceiling of his mine shaft fell on
him. Id at 919. The court reversed the lower court's dismissal, stating that the complaint
stated a claim for relief under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act. Id at 921.
Butsee Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549, 554 (D.S.D. 1983) (expressly
rejecting Mandolidis and stating that, "Wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct is not an inten-
tional tort").




ertheless issued an ultimatum: use the saw or go home.75 The
employee resumed operating the saw but when his hand came in
contact with the saw blade it severed two fingers and part of his
hand.76 The employee alleged, and the court agreed, that the em-
ployer had shown willful, wanton, malicious, and deliberate disre-
gard for the employee's safety, with a "deliberate intent to injure or
kill." 77
In allowing suit for willful, wanton, and reckless employer mis-
conduct, the Mandolidis court examined the legislative intent of the
state's workers' compensation statute.78 The court noted that years
ago, an employee's scant likelihood of recovery under the common
law tort system was inimical to the public interest.7 9 Consequently,
the legislature passed the workers' compensation act, intending to
cover all negligendy -caused industrial accidents.80 Later judicial inter-
pretations of the statute revealed a notable distinction between gross
negligence and "deliberate intent" as worded in the statute:8' only
where the employee proved deliberate intent, which included willful
misconduct, was he permitted common law recovery. 82  The
Mandolidis court cited past decisions as evidence that the legislature
did not intend to protect an employer where he willfully subjects an
employee to situations involving a high probability of serious harm
or death.83
75 Id at 915, 916.
76 Id at 914.
77 Id at 918. The employee's pre-trial depositions revealed that former employees had
been similarly injured while operating the employer's saws without safety guards. Id at 915-
16. One employee had been sent home for refusing to operate such a saw. Id at 916. Former
employees noted that the foreman removed the guards because they slowed production. Id
When the former union president informed the plant manager that Mandolidis had been
injured, he replied, "So what?" "He's getting compensation." Id at 916.
78 See note 72 supra.
79 246 S.E.2d at 910-11.
80 Id at 911 n.4. The legislature envisioned "a system dealing with employees, employ-
ers, and the public as necessarily mutual participants in bearing the burdens of such accidents,
displacing the one dealing only with the class of injuries happening through inadvertent failure,
without real moral turpitude, to exercise average human care." Id at 911 (quoting Milwaukee v.
Miller, 144 N.W. 188, 1"91 (1913)(emphasis in original)).
81 246 S.E.2d at 912. See Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70
(1934) (acts of gross negligence do not rise to the level of deliberate intent).
82 246 S.E.2d at 912. The court noted "that the carelessness, indifference, and negligence
of an employer may be so wanton as to warrant a judicial determination that his ulterior
intent was to inflict injury." Id (quoting Maynard v.,Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249,
253, 175 S.E. 70, 72 (1934)).
83 246 S.E.2d at 912. Although two later opinions precluded recovery absent a showing
of a "specific deliberate intent" to cause injury, they were rejected as non-controlling since
they lacked any discussion of the legislative purpose of the workers' compensation act. See
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Mandolidis rejected the idea of equating willful misconduct with
negligence.84 The court concluded that although the words willful,
wanton, and reckless may be interchangeable, they represent a stan-
dard different in kind rather than simply in degree from negligence. 85
Willfulness and negligence are mutually exclusive terms implying
"radically different mental states. '8 6 The court adopted the "non-
accidental" theory of the intentional tort exception.87 Applying that
theory, the court concluded that where injury or death is caused by
an employer's willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, it can no
longer be considered "accidental in any meaningful sense of the
word."88
IV. A Critical Analysis of Present Statutory Inclusion of Willful
Employer Misconduct
An accident happens by chance, without foresight or expecta-
tion.8 9 Workplace accidents are either unavoidable or occur through
the negligence of the employer or employee. 90 Intentional torts have
been exempted from workers' compensation coverage since these
torts demonstrate a state of mind inconsistent with that found in acci-
dents.9' Deciding whether or not the injury was an accident there-
fore necessitates looking at the actor's state of mind.
In negligence analysis, the standard is imposed as a matter of
law92 without regard to the actor's specific state of mind.9 3 Willful-
ness, however, requires a subjective realization of a risk of bodily in-
jury.94 A major difference between negligence and willful torts
regards their subjective realization of the risk. In negligence, this re-
alization is either absent or minimal. The difference in realization of
Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc., 135 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E.2d 87 (1951); Allen v.
Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E. 612 (1936).
84 246 S.E.2d at 913-14.
85 Id See also note 95 infra and accompanying text.
86 246 S.E.2d at 913-14.
87 Id at 914.
88 Id See notes 40-42 supra and 89-91 infa and accompanying text.
89 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 15 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
90 Because accidents are unforeseeable or unexpected, it would distort the meaning of the
term to attribute it to conduct accompanied by an intent to create the injury. Clearly, an
assault could never be considered an accident from the employer's point of view.
91 See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978). The court stated that
"[t]he workmen's compensation system completely supplanted the common law tort system
only with respect to negligenly caused industrial accidents." Id at 913 (emphasis in original).
92 W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 31, at 145.
93 See note 33 supra.
94 See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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risk, therefore, is generally one of degree, but is so great as to consti-
tute a difference in kind.95 Also, the level of culpability differs sub-
stantially between the two.
Actually, willful torts border so closely on intentional torts that
they differ in only one respect: willful torts require a strong probabiliOy
that harm may result; intentional torts require a substantial certainty
that harm may result.96 Both require an act intended by the actor.97
The willful actor makes a conscious choice of his course of action,
though the resultant harm is not intended.98 It is sufficient that he
knows of the strong probability of harm, even if he hopes no harm
will result.99
But because a willful tort does not require an intended result, it
cannot be said to equal an intentional tort. 00 Yet, willful conduct
departs so far from the meaning of "accident" that it should not be
included in workers' compensation's exclusivity provisions. In willful
misconduct cases, speaking ofaccidents at the workplace is inappropri-
ate, for in no way can the injurious results be considered unexpected
or unforeseen. Rather, the employer acts intentionally with at least a
conscious disregard of the probable results. Unfortunately, the present
statutory coverage of willful conduct permits employers who create
outrageously dangerous work environments to enjoy the relative pro-
tection of the limited workers' compensation recovery. The injured
employee is forced to accept an often inadequate workers' compensa-
tion award as his sole remedy. And because the relatively small
workers' compensation recovery provides little deterrence to the em-
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 comment g (1965). As Justice Holmes once
noted, "Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." 0.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881). Proof of the subjective realization of risk must gener-
ally be by circumstantial evidence. The employer's knowledge of applicable safety laws and
past deaths or injuries is relevant evidence. See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907,
914 n.10 (N. Va. 1978).
96 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 comment f (1965).
97 Id
98 Id comment g. The distinction between intentional and willful torts is that the inten-
tional actor affirmatively wishes to injure another while the willful actor is merely willing to
do so. Siesseger v. Puth, 213 Iowa 164, 172, 239 N.W. 46, 50 (1931).
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 comment f. The Restatement character-
izes willfulness as involving "an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial physical
harm." Id comment a.
100 See note 98 supra. See also Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549, 559
(D.S.D. 1983); Williams v. International Paper Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 794, 181 Cal. Rptr. 342,
hearing denied (1982). The court stated that willful torts "are labeled 'intentional' only be-
cause the law implies intent in such conduct." Id at 819, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 347. However,
the court concluded that such torts could be considered accidents and a hazard of the work-
place since the resulting injuries were not actually intended. Id
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ployer who creates unsafe work environments, the statute designed to
encourage safe work environments fails its purpose.
The initial workers' compensation plans were adopted during a
surge in industrial growth in the United States.10' Production was
paramount and worker safety poor. 102 Employer negligence suits
were difficult to prove. At its inception, workers' compensation fa-
vored the employee in his exchange of reduced but certain damages
for the employer's surrender of his three common law defenses.'0 3
But today, the employee gives away more than he receives in the
exchange. When considering an employer's willful misconduct in
light of both the reduced worth of the common law defenses104 and
the increased plaintiffs' recoveries, I0 5 the workers' compensation re-
covery is inadequate. The exchange between an employee's reduced
level of compensation and an otherwise possible common law recov-
ery for willful misconduct no longer appears just.
In agreeing to accept reduced awards under workers' compensa-
tion statutes, the employee sacrificed his right to sue for negligence in
exchange for his employer's sacrifice of the following defenses: con-
tributory negligence, assumption-of-the-risk, and the fellow servant
rule.106 It does not follow, however, that the employee meant to in-
clude in this exchange his right to sue for willful misconduct.10 7
101 The first workers' compensation acts were enacted in the early 1910's. 1 J. BOYD, THE
LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES TO WORKMEN § 5 (1913). A major factor influencing
enactment of workers' compensation acts was the unprecedented acceleration of industrial
growth. H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 9 (1954). Other factors
include immigration, corporate organization of industry, twelve-hour workdays, and child
labor. Id at 7-9.
102 Industrial accident rates peaked in 1907-1908. H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, .upra note
101, at 9. See also Nature and Oigins, supra note 5, at 228.
103 The injured employee no longer faced the likelihood of denial in his common law suit
against his employer. His recovery, albeit reduced, was certain.
104 See notes 108-14 infia and accompanying text. See also Herrera, Jr. & Scarzafava, Work-
place Safety-The Prophylactic and Compensatoq Rightr of the Employee, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 911,
948-49 (1982).
105 See E. CHEIT & M. GORDON, OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 17
(1963). In addition to increased verdicts, the probability of recovery is on the rise. Id
106 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
107 For example, in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), the court
overthrew a workers' compensation statute regarding dangerous activities. The statute cov-
ered employment injuries arising out of the employment or by the negligence of either the
employer or employee. The statute exempted the workman's own "serious and wilful miscon-
duct" from coverage. Id at 275, 94 N.E. at 433. Recall that such misconduct is a bar to
employer's serious and willful misconduct. See note 109 infra and accompanying text. Be-
cause the statute does not cover an employee's serious and willful misconduct, by implication,
the statute exempts an employer's serious and willful misconduct. Even the British Compen-
sation Act, which served as a basis for American legislation, allowed an exception (although
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Several reasons support excluding willful misconduct from the
employer-employee exchange. First, contributory negligence is not a
bar to an action for willful misconduct; 08 thus, if in willful miscon-
duct cases the employee traded away his right to sue for his em-
ployer's contributory negligence defense, the employee received
nothing in the exchange. The bar to a claim of willful misconduct is
one's own willful misconduct. 0 9 Second, although assumption-of-
the-risk technically bars a claim of willful misconduct," 10 its applica-
tion today is questionable. In difficult economic times, an employee
depends upon his job security. When faced with the alternative of
working in an unsafe environment or quitting his job, the employee
will in all likelihood feel compelled to "choose" working. Regarding
this as a truly voluntary choice distorts the meaning of the word "vol-
untary." Additionally, in some cases, like the disease-aggravation
cases,"' the employee is unaware of any possible risk of harm. He
could not possibly assume such a risk, since he fails to meet the doc-
trine's knowledge requirement." 2 Third, the fellow servant rule has
virtually disappeared with the advent of workers' compensation." 3
Its resurgence, although theoretically possible, is unlikely." 4 These
three common law defenses have little or no application to willful
torts. Consequently, by refusing to allow suits for willful employer
misconduct, courts hold not that the employee has traded away his
right to sue, but that he has in fact been robbed of it.
Allowing a common law recovery for willful employer miscon-
duct removes these torts from coverage by the workers' compensation
system's exclusivity provisions.' 5 As with the intentional tort excep-
tion, however, the employee must establish the employer's liability" 16
at an exclusive election by the employee) for injuries resulting from an employer's "wilful
act." Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., ch. 37, § 1.
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 503(1) (1965). See a/so W. PROSSER, suPra note
6, § 65, at 426.
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 503(3) (1965). See a/so W. PROSSER, supra note
6, § 65, at 426.
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 503(4) (1965). See a/so W. PROSSER, suPra note
6, § 68, at 456.
111 See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Johns-
Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Super. Ct., 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948 (1980).
112 For a discussion of the doctrine's knowledge of the risk requirement, see W. PROSSER,
supra note 6, at § 68.
113 W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 80, at 533-534.
114 Id
115 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
116 See notes 51-60 supra and accompanying text.
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and meet the consent defense. 17 To establish employer liability ab-
sent direct employer action, the employee should allege and prove an
element of employer direction or intention to commit the tort."18 De-
spite the problems with applying the doctrine of respondeat superior, 19
courts generally have no difficulty using it to find employer liability
in intentional tort cases. However, a rational justification for apply-
ing the doctrine should be set forth. For the doctrine to be properly
applied, the employee should have to show sufficient employer
awareness of the conduct to justify shifting the personal and moral
culpability to the employer.120 Allowing these willful tort suits also
raises the related issue of employee consent. This issue may be dis-
posed of on public policy grounds and the employer's superior bar-
gaining power.' 2 l
V. A Suggested Approach
Since the inception of workers' compensation plans in the
United States, courts have erroneously and irrationally considered
willful employer misconduct bound by statutory coverage. To rem-
edy this problem, an employee alleging willful employer misconduct
should be permitted to both institute his claim for workers' compen-
sation and bring suit against the employer if he desires. Any recovery
of compensatory damages should be offset by the amount of the
workers' compensation award, preventing double recovery. 22
Ideally, recovery for willful employer misconduct should be im-
plemented through the legislature. Statutory exceptions could be en-
acted in much the same method as statutory exceptions for
117 See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
118 This point was recently emphasized in Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F.
Supp. 549 (D.S.D. 1983). In denying the plaintiff's recovery for an alleged intentional tort by
the defendant Homestake, the court noted that, "Perhaps a greater defect of paragraph (f) [of
the complaint] is that there is no allegation that Homestake intended, commanded, directed
or authorized [the supervisor] Wiedenmeyer to commit an injurious act." Id at 559 n.6. See
Gallegos v. Christian, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60 (1981) (employer's liability outside of workers'
compensation grounded upon employer's actual intent to injure).
119 See notes 54-60 supra and accompanying text.
120 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.21, at 13-32 to 13-34.
121 See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1022 (1971 & Supp. 1982)(statute creating express
exception to workers' compensation coverage for employer's willful misconduct, granting in-
jured employee election between cliaming compensation and an action at law for damages).
This statute sets forth a good model for future legislation. However, it should be amended to
permit a non-exclusive election by the injured employee, thereby avoiding an employee's loss




intentional misconduct. 23 In states where willful employer miscon-
duct commands an increased penalty recovery under the workers'
compensation plan, the legislative change is imperative. But in states
where no such express limitation exists, the courts are as justified in
interpreting the willful misconduct exception as they were in the cre-
ation of the intentional tort exception. The history of the workers'
compensation system demonstrates that the courts have contributed
substantially to its developments and supports their further
contribution.t 24
In allowing these suits, courts may be accused of undermining
the workers' compensation system. 25 Critics could argue that a sys-
tem intended to cover all work-related injuries cannot possibly allow
such suits; to do so would upset the balance in favor of the em-
ployee. 126 But the system was designed to cover work-related acci-
dents.127 From the employee's viewpoint, willful injuries may still be
considered accidents because the employees do not expect them. 128
Thus, the employee should still be able to elect coverage under the
statutory system. But to permit the employer to willfully injure his
employees, and face a reduced level of "damages," ignores the legis-
lation's original intent. Willful conduct does not involve an accident
from the employer's perspective. 29 Moreover, suits for willful mis-
conduct support the safe work environment policy of workers'
compensation. 30
As with any change in precedent, opponents fear a flood of friv-
123 The rationale for the willful misconduct exception is the same as for the intentional
tort exception-neither conduct belongs within the design of workers' compensation. Both
conflict with reasonable interpretations of the word "accident" and can be interpreted as
outside workers' compensation immunity to common law liability.
124 E. CHEIT & M. GORDON, OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (1963).
Professor Arthur Larson notes that the courts express their dissatisfaction with archaic legisla-
tion. He states, "In fact, sometimes the court, in its accumulated frustration and impatience
with an outrageously obsolete statutory provision, will undertake a piece of statutory demoli-
tion which makes us applaud as humanitarians but wince as lawyers." Id
125 See, e.g., Williams v. International Paper Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 810, 814-15, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 346, heating denied (1982).
126 See, e.g., id at 814, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
127 See notes 41 and 89-91 supra and accompanying text.
128 The willfully tortious employer acts with an intent to commit the act and a probable
knowledge or disregard of the consequences. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. With
this state of mind, the employer cannot claim the injury was accidental. See notes 89-91 supra
and accompanying text.
129 Whether the injury is an accident is purely a subjective test by the employee. Bohlen,
supra note 4, at 340. From the employee's viewpoint, the intention or expectation of anyone
else is immaterial. Id at 341.
130 Bohlen, supra note 4, at 333.
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olous litigation designed to increase settlements.131 Defending and
settling these suits may become expensive, forcing employers to di-
vert resources from growth-oriented departments to meet court
costs. 132 Emphasizing these fears, however, overlooks the fundamen-
tal problem of permitting employers to consciously create dangerous
work environments. Workers' compensation philosophy cannot per-
mit employers' willful injury to employees.
An employer who willfully injures an employee should be liable
for common law damages. An employer should not be permitted to
defend his conduct by arguing that the increased costs of lawsuits
must eventually be "costed-out" in production and passed on to the
consumer, placing the employer at a competitive disadvantage. The
employer who chooses to engage in such tortious activity must suffer
the consequences. And if in costing-out the injuries the employer
overprices his product, he must bear the loss. Public policy disfavors
societal support of a producer who willfully injures his employees
and passes the cost on as an ingredient of the product.
VI. Conclusion
Courts and legislatures currently analyze willful, wanton, and
reckless employer misconduct erroneously. Workers' compensation
statutes were drafted to cover workplace accidents; willful misconduct
cannot be considered accidental. Yet the courts and legislatures con-
tinue to cloak the willfully tortious employer with workers' compen-
sation's limited liability. The employee injured by possibly egregious
conduct is relegated to his limited recovery and denied any common
law right to sue.
Limiting willful torts to the workers' compensation exclusive
remedy provision obstructs the legislations' goal to improve work-
place safety. Moreover, it permits employers to consciously create
unsafe work conditions without the threat of common law retalia-
tion. Additionally, the quid pro quo exchange upon which workers'
compensation is premised was never meant to include willful em-
ployer misconduct. Because this system is no longer equitable, courts
and legislatures should permit employees a common law recovery
for injuries caused by the willfully tortious employer.
Thomas D. Schroeder
131 See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907, 922 (W. Va. 1978)(Neely, J.,
dissenting).
132 See id at 923. (Neely, J., dissenting).
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